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In the process of furthering EU integration little attention was given to the role of income 
taxes. Multiple income tax systems exist across the Union and their differentiation nega-
tively impacts the European labour market, investments and savings, inhibiting economic 
growth. Individual nations have little motivation to harmonise as they can engage in tax 
rate competition and income taxes are interwoven with social security systems that make 
any attempts at reform extremely complex and politically unpopular. Much of current har-
monisation is “silent”, paralegal, and occurs in response to market forces rather than follow-
ing a formal plan and through intergovernmental cooperation.
Introduction
The idea of a single economic and currency area is based 
on enabling the free flow of goods, capital and people 
(labour) while subject to a single currency regime. The 
idea deals effectively with currency risk, trade barriers, 
assures easy access to the labour market and provides 
opportunities for investing in all member states.
Full  economic  integration  requires  consideration 
of taxes as an important factor in the furthering of 
integration processes, since EU member states are tax 
nations, e.g. countries where budgetary incomes come 
primarily from taxation. EU member state tax systems 
are strongly diversified, due to individual developmen-
tal paths shaped by national history of various lengths, 
civilisational development, culture, value systems, so-
cial and economic policy, which also define the state’s 
current financial needs. Even in a single state, taxes 
cannot remain neutral towards economic and social 
processes. Therefore, the challenge faced by EU cre-
ators was not the outright neutralisation of the impact 
that taxes had on the integration process, rather they 
worked towards limiting the negative consequences of 
overly diversified national tax systems. Gradual, long-
term harmonisation emerged as a continent-wide pro-
cess. During the development of the Treaty of Rome it 
was decided that, to assure a common market, it was 
enough to harmonise indirect taxes and remove trade 
barriers as they were the prime inhibitors to the flow 
of  goods  and  services.  The  harmonisation  of  direct 
(income) taxes was not considered as they were seen 
as not significantly affecting the single internal mar-
ket. Problems tied to direct taxation became visible as 
integration proceeded, the EU grew, its citizens began 
to migrate, multinational enterprises increased in size 
and scope and their financial flows (capital and profit 
transfers between headquarters and subsidiaries in dif-
ferent EU countries) became seriously affected (Mintz, 
2004: 221-234).
Because the Euro zone is relatively young and many 
integrative processes haven’t reached their end, we can 
look for analogies elsewhere: of nations that have a sin-
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gle currency but maintain differentiated tax systems in 
different parts of the country (Oates, 2001: 507-512). 
Canada and United States are good examples of federal 
states that have a single currency and where attempts 
at harmonisation of taxation were unsuccessful (Bald-
win  and  Krugman,  2004:  1-23).  Both  countries  are 
experiencing tax rate competition between different 
states (provinces) and research done on this topic is 
seen as extremely important for the furthering of har-
monisation policies in the European Union as seen in 
the works of G.R. Zodrow (2003: 651-671). It is worth 
mentioning that most works present controversies re-
garding the possibilities and need for tax system unifi-
cation as well as positive and negative consequences of 
tax rate competition and its impact on the behaviour 
of individuals and firms. Nonetheless, income tax har-
monisation is seen to be rather inevitable and should 
be understood as a natural effect of progressing unifi-
cation that follows the removal of trade barriers, re-
strictions to the flow of capital and labour and the ac-
ceptance of a single currency. In the theory of a single 
economic area, virtually no work was done on income 
taxation, its characteristics and differentiation, varia-
tion of tax rates, rules governing tax setting and prefer-
ences. We have to know although central and eastern 
European states widely adopted central bank indepen-
dence in the 1990s, many later baulked at meeting the 
Maastricht criteria and adopting the euro (Epstein and 
Johnson, 2010: 1237-1260).Two major issues should be 
pointed out about European integration:
1.   Union creators assumed that income taxes will be 
neutral towards integration processes.
2.  There will occur a natural convergence of tax sys-
tems  of  nations  belonging  to  the  economic  and 
currency union (Davidson, 2007).
1. Globalization and tax competition
It is a fact that the high and increasing international 
mobility of capital is not only a European but also a 
global phenomenon, associated with the ongoing glo-
balization process. Thus, the current tax competition 
issue in Europe is part of a wider question of economic 
policy in a constantly changing and integrating world 
economy. Yet in view of EMU and EU enlargement, 
there is a question of how the present applied regula-
tions in the field of EU taxation could be further de-
veloped so as to, on the one hand, face the increasing 
pressure of globalization and tax competition, and, on 
the other hand, remove another obstacle to free cross-
border activity in the SEM (completing thus the inte-
gration of the market) and foster economic integration 
in Europe. A satisfactory reply presupposes the exami-
nation of at least two issues, namely: 
1) whether globalization and European economic inte-
gration are in some sense complementary or rival 
to each other, and; 
2) whether tax competition in Europe subserves the 
integration or disintegration among EU states.
Although it may seem that globalization – as a process 
of global economic integration – includes European 
integration, the latter is a process of regional economic 
integration with objectives such as the avoidance of 
the “adverse effects” of globalization and international 
competition for members via the enlarged and more 
favorable economic space (which is institutionally as-
sured), and the continuous deepening of economic in-
tegration, co-operation and socio-economic cohesion 
among member countries. It is obvious that, on the 
one hand, economic integration in Europe exhibits a 
much higher degree of integration and moves towards 
a deeper and more complete form of economic integra-
tion than the globalization process induces, and on the 
other hand, that the objectives of those two integration 
processes are quite different for a number of issues.
Particularly, this means that tax competition is not 
a problem for the globalization process itself, where 
the integration among the world’s economies is much 
weaker. By contrast, within the European Union fiscal 
externalities arising from intra-EU tax competition are 
more significant. Furthermore, tax competition among 
EU states is in contrast with the objectives of European 
economic integration as indicated by official EU docu-
ments and treaties. The tax competition phenomenon 
and  the  recent  trend  of  undercutting  corporate  tax 
rates in the EU have not been induced by the require-
ments of the European economic integration process. 
It is rather the result of the general trend of falling cor-
porate taxation in the world economy.
From  the  preceding  discussion  it  should  become 
clear that the current EU tax system – for both indirect 
and direct taxation – constitutes a temporary solution 
and it is at transitional stage. In fact, the different tax 
systems in the SEM create a diverse and chaotic picture 
in the field of EU taxation, which cannot be in accor-38 T. Wołowiec, J. Soboń   
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dance with the current state of integration. On the oth-
er hand, the response to increasing economic integra-
tion and tax competition in Europe cannot be simply 
tax harmonization. As emphasized by the literature, in 
certain cases such a development would have negative 
welfare effects for some members and does not fully 
address the fiscal aspects of the integration process. 
However, it lays the foundation for closer co-operation 
in the tax field and paves the way for fiscal integration 
in the EU (Vogitzoglou, 2004: 119-125).
2. Differentiation of personal income  
taxation across the Union
Personal income taxes are strongly differentiated in EU 
member states in terms of setting the size of tax brack-
ets and taxable income level, where the differentiation 
focuses on different perceptions of what should consti-
tute the basis of taxation, different tax scales, tax cred-
its and allowable deductions. This process erodes the 
tax base (EC, 2008; OECD, 2006; IBFD, 2009). Most 
nations have a tax-free income that represents the ex-
penditure for minimal biological survival. Tax credits 
and allowable deductions are not only differentiated 
country by country but also are subject to fluctuations 
due to a changing social and economic national en-
vironment, the preferences of ruling political parties, 
phase of the business cycle (Zee, 2005).
EU member states have to consider the taxpayer’s 
ability to pay (occurring jointly, separately or as selected 
elements) when creating different components of Per-
sonal Income Tax (PIT) policies, which may include:
-  Setting a tax-free level of income that is offered to 
an unemployed spouse (e.g. in Slovakia), offered 
for each child being supported by the parents (e.g. 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Holland, Ger-
many, France, Greece, Slovenia, Lithuania).
-  Joint taxation of married couples (e.g. in Ireland, 
where we can find separate tax scales for single tax-
payers and married couples).
-  Specific  and  unique  taxation  of  family  income 
(France operates family quotient taxation that con-
siders the number of children in the family).
-  Constructions that permit the deduction of cer-
tain costs incurred while bringing up children (e.g. 
France) or even when supporting the family (e.g. 
Germany). 
-  Size and breadth of tax brackets.
-  Systems  defining  the  permissible  and  deductible 
expenses.
-  Systems of preferences depending on the family’s 
situation.
When analysing tax credits and allowable deductions 
present in EU member states (as subject-specific cred-
its, deductions from tax and tax base), four main cat-
egories can be identified:
1.  Compensation-type  preferences:  equivalency  and 
compensation payouts for used tools, clothing, trav-
el costs, refunding travel-to-work expenditures, etc.
2.  Social-type preferences: deductions for social sup-
port for foster families, support for foster families, 
war veterans, victims of crime, handicapped, el-
derly, etc.
3.  Stimulation-type  (economic)  preferences:  aimed 
at stimulating the taxpayer to engage in specific 
activities or modifying his behaviours. We can in-
clude  deductions  for  housing  (development  and 
renovation), preferential treatment of savings, pur-
chasing of stocks and bonds, educating children, 
professional development, health expenditures and 
retirement fund investments.
4.  Differentiated  incomes,  for  example  gambling 
wins, research grants, rewards for scientific activi-
ty, scholarships, contributions towards professional 
associations, etc.
So we should expect rational individuals to pursue tax-
benefit-seeking mobility of labour. In reality the exten-
siveness of this mobility would be dependent not only 
on “tax wedge” levels (share that PIT and national in-
surance consume from gross income) but also on level 
of wages, gross income levels, the nature of the labour 
market, quality of public services and infrastructure. 
Such rent-seeking tax migration would lead to increas-
ing the supply of qualified labour in the market of the 
accepting country (with a competitive tax system and 
good labour market) while worsening the labour mar-
ket situation in the country from which a worker has 
departed. As a result, countries keen to gain valuable 
workers could consider setting competitive tax rates 
to lure in new employees who would migrate and stay, 
contributing  to  national  economic  growth  and  pay 
their taxes in the accepting state. In this context har-
monisation would be seen as a process of equalisation 
of life and employment conditions that would reduce 
the need for “tax wedge” oriented analyses by workers.www.contemporary-economics.eu
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3.  Downward  trend  in  top  personal 
income tax rates since 1995
Currently, the top personal income tax (PIT) rate (2) 
amounts to 37.5%, on average, in the EU. This rate var-
ies very substantially within the Union, ranging from 
a minimum of 10% in Bulgaria to a maximum of 56.4 
in Sweden, as Denmark, which levied the highest PIT 
maximum rate until last year, has cut it to 51.5% (Taxa-
tion Trends 2009). As a rule, as has been the case in 
recent years, the new Member States, with the excep-
tion of Slovenia and Hungary, display below-average 
top rates, while the highest rates are typical of Member 
States with the most elevated overall tax ratios, such 
as  the  Nordic  countries,  although  the  Netherlands 
show the third highest top personal income rate while 
ranking 15th in terms of the tax ratio (excluding social 
security contributions). The lowest rates are found in 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Lithuania. In the lat-
ter two the overall tax ratio (excluding SSCs) is among 
the lowest in the Union, which is however not really 
the case in Bulgaria (Taxation Trends, 2009).
For the first time in several years, the top PIT rate 
has increased, on average, in 2010, despite the sizeable 
Danish cut, as several EU Member States enacted in-
creases (the UK introduced a new 50% rate, ten points 
higher than the previous maximum, but Greece and 
Latvia too hiked their top rates). It is plausible to at-
tribute this reversal to the effect of the economic and 
financial  crisis  as  until  this  year,  there  had  been  a 
clear, steady and widespread downward trend in the 
top rate. From 1995 to 2009, almost all EU Member 
States cut their top rate, with only three keeping it un-
changed  (Malta,  Austria  and  The  United  Kingdom) 
and one (Portugal) increasing it slightly. Even taking 
into account the subsequent 0.4 average rate increase 
in 2010, all in all, the EU-27 average has gone down 
by 9.9 percentage points since 1995, accelerating after 
2000. The post-2000 acceleration is most noticeable in 
the Central and Eastern European countries, with the 
biggest cuts having taken place in four countries that 
adopted flat rate systems, Bulgaria (–30.0 percentage 
points), the Czech Republic (–17.0), Romania (–24.0) 
and Slovakia (–23.0); the acceleration was, however, 
visible also in the old EU Member States (Taxation 
Trends, 2008). One should nevertheless note that the 
increase in the average in 2010 is due to sizeable hikes 
in a small number of countries, while the overwhelm-
ing majority of Member States, including several that 
have been amongst the strongest hit by the crisis, have 
kept their top PIT rate constant. Lower PIT top rates 
do not necessarily imply a trend towards lower PIT 
revenues, because in systems with several tax brack-
ets, the percentage of taxpayers taxed under the high-
est rate is typically quite limited. In addition, changes 
in the tax threshold can have important effects on the 
tax liability, even at unchanged rates; for example, in 
2009, Austria increased the threshold for the top 50% 
bracket by around 18%, reducing the tax liability, but 
this is not visible when looking only at the rate. Several 
countries, however, have moved towards systems with 
fewer brackets, or to flat rate systems, which are char-
acterised by a single PIT tax rate, so that any reduction 
is immediately reflected in the tax revenue. Further-
more, cuts in the top PIT rate typically do not occur in 
isolation, but are part of balanced packages which may 
include tax reductions for lower-income taxpayers or 
measures to offset the loss of revenue.
As of 2010, these Member States comprise Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Roma-
nia, and Slovakia. As can be seen, all flat rate systems 
in the EU were introduced by new Member States, the 
latest two being Bulgaria and the Czech Republic in 
2008. All of these show a lower than average revenue 
from the PIT, although the distance from the EU mean 
value is not very marked for the three Baltic States 
(Taxation Trends, 2009: 20).
4. Theoretical foundations of income 
tax harmonisation
Income taxes are characterised by a clear link between 
the taxpayer’s situation (income, wealth) and the tax 
burden placed upon him (Alworth and Arachi, 2008). 
As such, income taxes can have a negative impact, be 
de-motivating, as the tax will inhibit income-generat-
ing and investment activity and that will negatively im-
pact the speed of economic growth (Caroll and Holtz-
Eakin, 2000; Widman, 2001). This means that not only 
the sheer size of the tax burden is important, but also 
we have to consider the entire structure of the tax sys-
tem, each tax and the definition of tax scales/brackets 
(Meghir  and  Philips,  2008;  Sabrinova,  Buttrick  and 
Duncan, 2008).
Inadequacies of tax theories combined with a po-
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sonal income taxes impact even the microeconomic 
approach, where it should be easy to establish a causal 
link between the tax burden, tax scale and the taxpay-
er’s economic situation and resulting decisions. This is 
a result of multiple interacting factors affecting the tax-
payer; therefore isolation of the tax factor is difficult, 
if  we  bypass  highly  abstract  analyses.  The  situation 
becomes even more complicated when the subject of 
analysis becomes the impact of a given tax on a spe-
cific group of taxpayers or of a specific tax on the entire 
economy  (e.g.  automatic  stabiliser  theory)  (KMPG, 
2008). We have to add the fact that income taxes are 
only part of a wider burden, since they are combined 
with national security contributions (social insurance) 
and often it is those social security contributions that 
are modified to increase governmental revenues, while 
maintaining an illusion of tax rate stability. 
The complexity of tax analysis from the perspec-
tive of income tax impacting a taxpayer and the wider 
economy increases when we take the analysis beyond 
the borders of a single country. Tax relations become 
increasingly complex, and the impact of particular in-
come taxation becomes extremely difficult to evaluate, 
quantify. This statement can be taken as the explana-
tion for existing tax controversies: tax harmonisation 
between nations versus the freedom to engage in un-
limited tax competition.
A theoretical analysis of the effects of tax differentia-
tion can occur on several axes, including:
-   Impact of PIT on costs of labour. High taxes in-
crease labour costs since after-tax income (dispos-
able) is low and thus causes pay-increase demands 
from the workers and this in turn complicates the 
company’s  competitive  standing  and  affects  its 
profitability (when compared to companies operat-
ing in other, more beneficial tax environments).
-   Taxes as a burden. They force a defensive response 
from the taxpayer in the form of seeking oppor-
tunities to transfer the burden onto other entities. 
Centuries long observation of taxpayer reactions 
to tax burdens show that, even if desirable, burden 
shifting is much easier in the case of indirect taxes 
than direct ones (in this case the most common 
technique  involves  limiting  economic  activity) 
(James, Nobes, 1995).
-   Tax burden transferability is different for employ-
ees and employers. Increased labour costs will af-
fect production costs and this affects final product/
service prices. Opportunities open to the employer 
will depend on the type of the good/service under 
taxation and the state of the market (competition), 
which is defined through elasticity of demand. In-
elasticity of demand for a good will assure easier 
transfer of tax burdens by the employer onto the 
client. A second possible reaction is to transfer the 
burden onto the employees by lowering their wag-
es. Opportunities here will be defined by the cur-
rent state of the labour market, its openness, level 
of unemployment and elasticity of labour supply.
-   Measuring  the  transferability  of  the  tax  burden. 
The process is difficult even in the case of a closed 
economy because the effects of increasing taxes can 
be hidden in prices, non-wage production costs, 
producer profitability. These difficulties are multi-
plied in an open economy where the mechanism 
of transferring the tax burden affects the society 
and economy of a different nation. In a theoretical 
sense, “tax dumping”1 leads to a redistribution of 
income between different societies as it assures that 
part of the income is transferred to nations with 
lower  taxes  through  transfer  pricing  or  through 
the  transfer  of  company  operations  to  locations 
with favourable tax regimes. The impact on nations 
not operating “tax dumping” policies is a need to 
increase tax rates to maintain governmental rev-
enues (for those taxpayers that remain) or reduce 
governmental expenditures (politically difficult) or 
increase national debt (finding lenders willing to 
fund continued expenditures)2.
In  the  era  of  internationalisation  of  economic  rela-
tions and integration, the tax burden transfer mecha-
nism becomes international, in terms of taxation on 
incomes,  labour,  economic  activity,  interest,  capital 
returns,  etc.  Personal  decisions  regarding  where  to 
undertake paid employment (with the assumption that 
there are no restrictions on the movement of labour) 
will be affected by offered wages and required taxes. 
Income migration therefore becomes natural as people 
gravitate towards locations where incomes and taxes 
are the most beneficial. Of course, changing the loca-
tion of activity is much easier for an employee than for 
an employer and entrepreneur as the latter two have to 
adapt to the requirements of the host country to where 
their activity is being transferred (for entire company www.contemporary-economics.eu
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or its part, subsidiary). Both labour and capital would 
therefore benefit from tax harmonisation as it would 
simplify operations and create a more balanced envi-
ronment that would reduce the need for mobility ori-
ented purely on seeking tax benefits.
Both tax rate harmonisation and tax rate competi-
tiveness require additional consideration of:
-  Impact of PIT rate harmonisation upon the state 
budget and possible imbalance of public finances 
(harmonisation  worsening  national  budgets,  e.g. 
through downward integration of tax rates).
-  Impact of labour mobility upon the nation’s econ-
omy (income migration further enhanced by PIT 
rates).
-  Impact of changes in the tax system, which affect 
the ratios of: indirect-direct taxes, CIT-PIT, when 
they are intended to draw in foreign investments.
In  small  open  economies  that  seek  new/additional 
capital resources these issues are further differentiated: 
in the case of transforming economies and developing 
nations their situation is much more difficult than of 
countries with a strong position within an economic 
grouping or the entire global economy.
Economic aims of tax harmonisation may be unach-
ievable due to legal reasons, since a tax is not only an 
economic category but also a legal one, and its legal 
side is affected by:
-  Relationship  between  national  and  Community 
law, and when considering the supremacy of EU 
law over national rules, many issues emerge (e.g. 
conflicting regulations, different interpretations).
-  Problems of applying (and in what measures) un-
limited tax duty3 in one country compared to ap-
plying unlimited tax duty in one country with a 
limited duty in the second country and, finally, how 
to apply unlimited tax duties in both countries.
-  How to formulate and agree upon treaties on avoid-
ing double taxation (not only achieving consensus 
between nations but also following local political 
patterns, taxation trends).
-  Problems in whether to collect the tax in country 
of residence or non-residence and in what propor-
tions.
5. Legal foundations of harmonisation
The notion of harmonising direct income taxes, es-
pecially on corporate and capital returns appeared in 
an early stage of Community creation. This was pur-
sued although harmonisation was not included in the 
Treaty, whose creators focused instead on harmonisa-
tion of indirect taxes. Nonetheless, the Treaty contains 
Article 94, which calls for the harmonisation of legal 
regulations that directly impact the operations of the 
internal market. This can be seen as the beginning of 
efforts aimed at direct tax harmonisation (Szeląg, 2003: 
91-96). Article 308 allows the Council, based on a re-
quest for the European Commission and after consult-
ing with the EU Parliament, may undertake activities 
aimed at achieving an aim within the common market. 
This requires unanimous approval of all member states, 
which will be extremely difficult to achieve, seeing that 
personal income taxes are the most “political” of taxes 
and are a major fiscal tool for all EU nations.
The problem of taxing personal incomes and their 
impact  on  the  free  movement  of  labour  and  capital 
was only partially visible to the Union. Below is a list of 
documents in which the topic of taxing personal income 
appeared in various contexts and partial manner:
-  Neumark Report, 1962;
-  EU Commission Memorandum, 1967;
-  EU Commission Memorandum, 1969;
-  White Book on the Creation of the Common Mar-
ket, 1985;
-  Ruding Report, 1992;
-  White Book on integrating associated nations of 
Central and Eastern Europe with the EU internal 
market that was approved at the EU Council meet-
ing in Cannes, 1995;
-  Code of Conduct for Business Taxation;
-  Council Directives in various years covering avoid-
ance of double taxation, taxing savings, dividends, 
shares and entities operating in various member 
states.
5.1.  Rules  regarding  the  avoidance  of  double 
taxation of income and wealth
Tax problems for individuals who change their place 
of work and residence are not new, especially when 
we  consider  the  notion  of  avoiding  double  taxa-
tion  of  income.  Currently,  the  majority  of  nations 
have signed bilateral agreements on avoiding double 
taxation, based on early work by the OECD that had 
developed a “model agreement” intended to ease ne-
gotiations, with the newest model proposed in 1996. 42 T. Wołowiec, J. Soboń   
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Only the Nordic Treaty between Denmark, Finland, 
Sweden, Iceland and Norway is not bilateral in nature 
and should be seen as a precursor of things to come in 
providing precise multinational solutions. The OECD 
Convention is still the prime example and has affected 
the development of similar policies in the Union. It 
predicts three possibilities for taxing income gained in 
different nations:
1.  Taxing the entire income or wealth created in a dif-
ferent country.
2.  Nations share the income from taxation in varying 
proportions depending on the subject of taxation 
(dividends, interest on savings, etc).
3.  Nations, on whose territory the income or wealth 
was created, cannot tax them (sale of shares, license 
fees, scholarships).
5.2. Rules regarding capital income tax
The  current  investor-friendly  culture  assures  that  in-
creasing numbers of EU citizens invest their money in 
multiple companies and expect to gain a profit that is lat-
er taxed. The broad rules for taxing dividends and prof-
its from business operations of multinational businesses 
are defined by EU directives. Yet, individual countries, 
have certain freedom in this respect, for example by dif-
fering in the way such taxes are collected. Two methods 
exist: taxing the profits of the company and foregoing 
taxing shareholders and partners or allowing the com-
pany not to pay a tax on the paid-out profit and the tax 
obligation rests on shareholders and partners. Countries 
differ in the preferred method (Vlachy 2008: 649-661)4.
5.3. Rules regarding taxing profits from savings
Harmonising the taxation of savings residing in bank 
accounts has focused on preventing any restrictions to 
the flow of capital between member states that could 
be imposed by national tax laws. The key to such har-
monisation is therefore not to enforce a single tax rate 
for all states: every state is free to set its own taxes 
(level, differentiation) and profits from savings can be 
separated from other personal income and taxed with 
a separate rate or included in total incomes.
6. Taxing individual incomes for those 
not conducting business activities
The main characteristic of direct taxation is the small 
extent to which it has been normatively harmonised. 
Since direct taxes are seen to have less of a negative 
impact  on  the  operations  of  the  Common  Market, 
therefore work on their harmonisation has begun late 
and has not progressed as far as the work done on in-
direct taxes. Nations have been left to define their own 
internal policies but are required to assure fair treat-
ment to local and international entities. The analysis of 
individual income taxation in EU states, the direction 
of its evolution and the future of tax policy allows for 
the formulation of two arguments: the extensive dif-
ficulties of harmonising the construction of personal 
income tax and a progression of “quiet harmonisation” 
(paralegal). The arguments presented below confirm 
the proposed arguments.
EU member state tax systems created since the Sec-
ond World War, were strongly influenced by the ideas 
of John Maynard Keynes who moved away from the 
notion  of  tax  neutrality  and  placing  specific  parafis-
cal functions on the tax system. Taxation of personal 
income is one of the most fundamental techniques for 
redistributing  income,  allowing  for  the  realisation  of 
principles of equality and justice and taxing of “pure in-
come” (all three rules are expected of every tax system in 
the union), and stimulating desirable behaviours in the 
spheres of production and consumption. As such direct 
taxes have a much different impact upon the division 
of income and wealth than indirect taxes. Income taxes 
possess an “inbuilt stabilising flexibility”, e.g. in times of 
recession they inhibit the fall of global demand and in 
times of growth, slow down its expansion. Progressive 
income taxation of individuals leads to a much faster fall 
in governmental revenues due to a fall in the citizens’ 
income. As such, despite declaring intended tax system 
neutrality, EU member states allow parafiscal functions 
to affect the construction of the PIT framework, which 
in turn makes harmonisation extremely difficult.
The current belief is that differentiation in setting 
the rules governing direct taxation poses a small chal-
lenge to the functioning of the Common Market. It is 
based on:
1.  Income taxes in their pure form do not stimulate the 
propensity to save and invest. Income taxes impact 
both the saved part of income as well as the spent. To 
stimulate saving and/or spending it is necessary to 
introduce allowable deductions and tax credits that 
would be obtainable upon increasing existing sav-
ings or investments or undertaking them.www.contemporary-economics.eu
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2.  Income taxes do not affect the choice of socially 
beneficial structure of production and selection of 
factors of production nor the application of tech-
nologies that will protect the environment. Achiev-
ing these aims requires the application of allowable 
deductions and tax credits.
3.  Income taxes do not affect the choice of socially 
beneficial  structure  of  consumption.  It  does  not 
seem possible to introduce appropriate allowable 
deductions  and  tax  credits  that  would  allow  for 
guiding the expenditure of households.
Harmonisation of income taxes is much more difficult 
than harmonisation of indirect taxes from the practi-
cal, technical and legal perspective and is a result of:
1.  When creating the Treaty of Rome it was decided 
that direct taxes would not have a notable impact 
on the operations of the internal market, and that 
approach led to a lack of appropriate regulations, 
especially in the area of personal income taxes.
2.  Income taxes, as forms of direct taxation are an im-
portant tool for fiscal policy that affects social and 
economic activities and it is difficult for politicians 
to abandon this tool for managing national policies.
3.  Directives requiring the formulation of direct tax 
harmonisation must be agreed upon with a major-
ity vote in the national Assemblies (Parliaments), 
which leads to a lack of consensus on desired aims, 
costs and benefits, procedures.
4.  Progress  in  direct  tax  harmonisation  creates  an 
aura of challenges to the tax independence if na-
tions and leads to entrenchment of state and elite 
positions.
5.  EU member states have different rules for remuner-
ating employees, setting incomes from retirement 
funds and affecting the structure of income-generat-
ing costs and expenditures that reduce the tax base.
Despite the lack of Directives to regulate the rules of 
taxing personal income, the rules are emerging spon-
taneously and tax burdens are slowly equalising. This 
process is the result of competition between EU mem-
ber state tax systems—nations extensively are utilising 
the construction of the personal income tax to utilise 
the stimulating functions of the tax system, which in 
turn impacts the possibilities open to spontaneous PIT 
harmonisation. Due to the effects of “quiet” paralegal 
harmonisation,  several  common  PIT  characteristics 
can be found in the EU:
1.  Placing subjectivity on the principle of residence. 
Rules on limited (<183 days), and unlimited (>183 
days) tax duty.
2.  The dominant concept is of a global tax. Joint taxa-
tion of all incomes obtained by the taxpayer from 
different sources (only the rules regarding capital 
interests  are  exempt  from  being  combined  with 
other incomes).
3.  The tax is progressive and specific solutions con-
cern different tax rates, types of scales, rules re-
garding progression and the size of the minimal 
and maximum rates.
4.  Tax  burdens  are  designed  to  follow  inflation 
through a system of automatic or semi-automatic 
indexation or through the change of tax brackets.
5.  Different  regulations  are  applied  to  a  family  in-
come, sale of real estate, assets and investment in-
comes.
6.  In every construction there exists a sum free from 
taxation  and,  in  varying  degrees,  considers  the 
minimal level of (biological) existence and costs of 
obtaining an income.
7.  Tax burdens are considerate of, in varying degrees, 
state of the family and capabilities to pay through a 
system of rebates and deductions.
8.  Multiple rebates and deductions exist that are of a 
simulative and social character (investment, build-
ing and renovation, health, donations).
The analysis of Union laws indicates that personal in-
come tax harmonisation is extremely difficult due to 
historical, political, social and technical factors. Deci-
sions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) concern 
mostly  tax  deductions  by  individuals  who  are  not 
Union residents and the deductions of contributions 
made to retirement funds operating outside the EU. 
The ECJ decisions cannot affect the rules for harmon-
ising personal income taxes because they concern the 
taxing of income from savings and the exchange of tax 
information, while the progressing “quiet” harmonisa-
tion is rather a result of inter-nation competitiveness 
and not of any formal ECJ rulings.
Alongside  minimal  lawmaking  at  the  European 
level, minimal progress of harmonisation is a result of:
1.  Political factors: PIT payers are the largest group 
in any nation. Politicians are unwilling to abandon 
PIT techniques in pursuing regulatory and stimu-
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e.g. any activity in this are will have an impact on 
the political balance of the nation. PIT setting is an 
important and valuable tool in maintaining rela-
tions with voters.
2.  PIT harmonisation is not an important factor in 
the evolution of the Common Market. It is neutral 
to internal trade and does not affect intra-EU com-
petition and as such will not become a European 
priority for some time.
3.  PIT taxes mainly incomes from work and retire-
ment and the level of taxation does not increase 
intra-EU migration (although in the long-run this 
may change).
4.  In EU member states, social support systems are 
funded from different sources: taxpayer contribu-
tions, direct funding from the state budget (social 
security contributions are then contained within 
standard taxes, e.g. Denmark) and as they form 
part of the total “tax wedge”, their harmonisation 
will be even more difficult (while exerting sizeable 
influence on the PIT system).
5.  EU member states possess different systems of labour 
remuneration and shaping of citizen income levels, 
different methodologies of designing tax progression. 
Therefore even creating a holistic and long-term un-
derstanding of existing complexities will be difficult.
Conclusions
Harmonisation in general is a difficult challenge, and 
any debate about harmonising PIT systems brings out 
major counterarguments:
1.  Further  loss  of  sovereignty  in  national  financial 
policies, which will inhibit the state’s ability to af-
fect  economic  processes  and  (especially)  social 
ones. Harmonisation of the rules for calculating 
the basis for taxation and the acceptance of unified 
rates would mean the transfer of tax-setting pre-
rogatives to a trans-national institution: the EU. In 
such a situation, each nation must conduct its own 
analysis of costs and benefits (of transferring those 
competencies versus their retention).
2.  Different  social  models  and  retirement  systems, 
when combined with varied degrees of PIT inte-
gration with retirement contributions, determine 
various financial needs of the state, therefore har-
monisation would have to reach far beyond “mere” 
PIT systems.
3.  Historical, cultural, social factors that have shaped 
national tax systems enforce claims that path-de-
pendent process will be difficult to reverse.
4.  Competitive  inequality  between  taxpayers  who 
operate in one market and those that function in 
multiple EU member states. Depending on their 
primary country of residence it can be an advan-
tage to pay taxes elsewhere (when the other nation’s 
tax regime is friendlier, e.g. for Poles employed and 
taxed in the UK) or a disadvantage (when British 
taxpayers operating in Poland or Poles earning in 
the UK are subject to Polish taxation).
Not withstanding abovementioned criticisms, the follow-
ing predictions can me made regarding income tax (pri-
marily PIT) harmonisation across the European Union:
1.  Harmonisation of direct taxes is unavoidable, but 
it will be a long-term process and will affect CIT 
before PIT (reducing complexity of trans-border 
business operations will be a priority compared to 
easing the life of individual taxpayers). It is likely 
that the global economic crisis (2008-2009?) will 
negatively impact the speed of any harmonisation 
as  governments  focus  on  surviving  the  difficult 
period  and,  since  research  suggests  that  speedy 
harmonisation negatively affects economic growth, 
governments will remain weary of such processes, 
keen to defend any possible economic growth (and 
thus their own positions) (Kopits, 1992).
2.  The  current  process  of  direct  tax  harmonisation 
is in an early stage of progress due to existing ex-
tensive  national  variations.  Forces  promoting 
reform are more economic and include the uni-
fied market, common currency, need to increase 
competitiveness. Opposing forces are more ideo-
logical and focus on the dangers of sacrificing fiscal 
competencies, especially that these powers will be 
handed over to a supranational body. The need for 
unanimous voting when backed by the complex-
ity of current tax policies are the main causes for 
a slow harmonisation process (rationality of pure 
tax-related arguments comes in conflict with local 
political rationality).
3.  At the very least, it is crucial to assure the enforce-
ment and optimisation of regulations covering the 
avoidance of double taxation, both personal (PIT) 
and business (CIT). The need for speedy resolu-
tions  stems  from  the  growth  and  expansion  of www.contemporary-economics.eu
45 EU Integration and Harmonisation of Personal Income Taxation
DOI: 10.5709/ce.1897-9254.3
trans-border  economic  activity  and  the  removal 
of barriers to the movement of labour which com-
plicate  proper  income  taxation  (calculation  and 
collection). It is necessary to employ a holistic ap-
proach to this issue and that calls for a review of 
signed bilateral agreements by their signatories, in-
troducing required corrections and signing of new 
agreements with EU members.
4.  PIT harmonisation should focus on achieving in-
tergovernmental agreement on calculating the tax 
base, to avoid distortions in the real tax rate (tax 
brackets). The concept of taxable income is a re-
sult of local costs of generating the income, rebates 
and deductions and the current methods of set-
ting them differ in each country. The same com-
ment relates to the methodology used for defining 
tax progression and the concepts of minimal and 
maximum rates and the social aspects of the PIT.
5.  When discussing PIT harmonisation it is important 
to remember about the integration of this tax with 
social  security  contributions,  as  both  contribute 
to the burden placed on labour. They are comple-
mentary and form the “tax wedge” (the difference 
between the gross labour costs to the employer and 
the net income for the employee) and are important 
for businesses when considering the costs-versus-
reward of creating new employment opportunities 
(positions). When PIT is coordinated with social 
security contributions, attempts at coordination or 
harmonisation become extremely difficult as two 
different  deduction  systems  and  multiple  minis-
tries in each state become involved.
6.  A controversial issue is the competitive lowering of 
PIT rates, and nations intent on lowering (“dump-
ing”) their effective tax rates ought to consider the 
impact of those actions on the wider Union, espe-
cially from the perspective of affecting competitive 
equilibriums (Bolkstein, 2002).
7.  It is important to approach with caution the con-
cepts  regarding  the  removal  of  the  capital  gains 
tax since this would promote speculative activity 
(due to resulting high profits), while discriminat-
ing against labour incomes and profits from (more 
laborious,  productive  and  long-term)  economic 
activity.  Much  more  beneficial  would  be  the  re-
moval of taxes on savings, as it would stimulate an 
increase in the rate of savings and make more capi-
tal available to fund economic growth.
8.  It is difficult to expect that the EU will evolve into 
a federal state, but only such a structure would give 
the Union the right to set and collect taxes. The, tax 
policies would be formulated and implemented in 
a top-down manner that would allow for the imple-
mentation of a uniform (harmonised) tax system. 
It is unlikely that member states will agree to such a 
solution, especially due to the political importance 
and financial role of income taxes. Therefore, we 
can expect that income taxes will remain decentra-
lised, e.g. under the control of individual nations 
(Tanzii, Zee, 1998).
9.  A question emerges regarding the future possibili-
ties for the income tax becoming a “European tax” 
and whether such an idea is realistic (Agra Facts, 
2007, Kucharek, 2007: p. 11-15). The debate about 
setting a European tax started with the underlining 
of the weaknesses of available financial resources 
and defining the new model of EU budget revenues. 
The EU Commission proposed the personal income 
tax as a tax that fulfils eight criteria (in three groups): 
budgetary (sufficiency and stability), effective (rec-
ognition, low operating costs, effective allocation of 
resources), just (vertical and horizontal, income that 
assumes that the level of this tax is in balance with 
economic development). When considering the PIT, 
the Commission proposed three possible ways of es-
tablishing the PIT as a European tax:
-  Poll tax, set at about 260 Euro;
-  Percentage of national PIT revenues (visible as a 
separate position in the annual tax declaration);
-  Separate EUPIT (two tax declarations: national and 
EU). Its introduction would increase implementa-
tion and collection costs and its very creation would 
require a Decree by the Council (in key elements) 
and a Directive (in the administrative section);
The EU Commission focused on the last concept. Com-
pleted analyses indicate that EUPIT set at 10% of current 
national PIT rates (coupled with a matching reduction 
in national PIT) would provide appropriate funds to the 
EU. It is improbable that a EU tax will be implemented 
from 2014, because the decision is purely political and 
not economical and requires unanimous agreement by 
all EU member states. Considering the specifics of the 
PIT presented in this article, it is unlikely that the PIT 
will become the basic EU tax in the foreseeable future.46 T. Wołowiec, J. Soboń   
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Notes
 1.  The term “tax dumping” was popularised by Chan-
cellor Gerhard Schroeder in 2004, when he chal-
lenged new EU member states and their tax reforms 
that were aimed, as Schroeder claimed, at affecting 
fair competition policies in the Union by offering 
good operating conditions for companies form the 
“old” Europe.
2.  On  26th  May  2004,  Ministers  of  Finance  from 
Germany and France, worried that their countries 
would  suffer  the  most  from  tax-benefit-seeking 
company migration, proposed the first unification 
of corporate (CIT) tax rates: minimal rates, formal-
ising the methods of calculating incomes, profits, 
defining expenses. 
3.  Unlimited tax duty applies to those residing in a 
country for more than 183 days of a tax year, while 
limited tax duty is applied to those who spend less 
than 183 days.
4.  Jan Vlachy presents very interesting analysis of a 
single-period option-based model to analyze the net 
value of business income under uncertainty, focus-